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is no consensus on how best to conceptualize, measure and aggregate migration policy 
indicators to allow for meaningful comparisons through time and across space. This article 
discusses these methodological challenges and introduces practical solutions that involve 
historical, multi-dimensional, disaggregated and transparent conceptualizing, measuring and 
compiling of cross-national immigration policies. Such an approach informs the International 
Migration Policy and Law Analysis (IMPALA) database. 
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Measuring and Comparing Immigration, Asylum and Naturalization 
Policies Across Countries: Challenges and Solutions 
 
 
 
1 Resource deficits facing scholars and policy makers 
 
  
Over the last half-century, immigration policies and law have expanded to accommodate and 
regulate the increasing number of people who migrate outside their countries of origin. While 
there were approximately 75 million people living outside their country of birth in 1960, by 
2010 this number had nearly tripled to 214 million.i In 1960, 30 countries hosted more than 
half a million immigrants each. Forty years later, this number had more than doubled to 64 
countries (UN 2013). While ‘settler’ states like Australia, Canada and the United States (US) 
have seen the proportion of overseas born residents climb sharply over this period, the 
immigration phenomenon has left few nations untouched.  Countries everywhere have faced 
the twin challenges of devising policies to manage migrants’ admission and determine 
whether and how to incorporate foreigners into the destination society. However, scholars, 
researchers, and policymakers have not had the resources to measure, evaluate or compare 
immigration policies and law across countries and time in a truly systematic manner.   
 
Certainly, social scientists have worked on numerous small and medium-scale studies that 
highlight differences between ‘settler’ countries, ‘post-colonial’ countries like Britain, France 
and Germany and occasionally ‘non-colonizing’ countries like Switzerland and Sweden. 
However, the overall picture is only partially clear. We are still unable to answer such basic 
questions as whether there is a universal push to limit immigration; whether restrictive 
measures include some, most or all categories of immigration including family, humanitarian 
and student migration; how restrictions are imposed; and how admissions policies have 
varied over time. Nor, for instance, do we know the extent of ‘managed migration’ regimes 
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that seek to facilitate the admission of the highly skilled, restricting the entry of labour 
migrants, or featuring a ‘skill shortage’ programme that targets certain routine and manual 
workers. We also lack the tools to discern which countries facilitate student migration in 
order to attract university, vocational or language students from other countries.  
 
Social scientists are no longer satisfied to consider immigration policy descriptively, or in 
single country cases: they are now seeking the means to measure and compare immigration 
policies globally. The challenge is that there is still no comprehensive, cross-national, time-
series database of immigration policies. Such a database would allow us to build policy 
indicators of stringency and orientation to track important trends in immigration policy across 
countries and time, and to analyze the causes and consequences of immigration regulation 
more systematically.  
 
The paper begins by reviewing how existing studies have conceptualized immigration policy 
in order to create cross-nationally comparative quantitative measures. Of particular interest is 
the selection of indicators and their combination or aggregation into summary indices.ii. Our 
discussion explores the most prominent indices of immigration and asylum policies (Timmer 
and Williamson 1996; Thielemann 2004, 2006; Hatton 2004; Lowell 2005; MIPEX 2011; 
Cerna 2008; Ruhs 2011; Ortega and Peri 2009; FrDB-IZA 2011) and naturalization policies 
(EUDO 2011; Howard 2005, 2006, 2009; Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997; Koopmans et al 
2005, 2012; Helbling 2008; Janoski 2010) existing at the time of writing. Although the phrase 
‘immigration policy’ generally refers to both policies of admission and integration, our focus 
is on admission policies. Even so, we review indices of integration because this is an area 
where some prominent developments have taken place (e.g. MIPEX 2011). We also consider 
naturalization policies, as citizenship may be construed as the final step of admission into the 
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state—the legal hurdle that separates immigrants from official membership. Having set out 
some of the methodological challenges of devising comparative measures of immigration 
policy, we describe how we propose to overcome these problems in order to measure the 
restrictiveness of admissions policy—the primary objective of the in-progress IMPALA 
Database. The article concludes with a discussion of the kind of contributions that are made 
possible by the availability of such data. 
 
2 Conceptualizing and measuring migration policies: A review 
 
Concept and Scoping"
Any attempt to measure policy should be clear about the concept to be captured. When 
seeking to measure immigration policy, scholars identify the means by which governments 
aim to regulate the number and attributes of foreigners who enter and reside in their territory 
and their avenues for naturalization following entry.  Beyond this core definition, there is 
little consensus over the conceptually essential elements of a country’s migration, asylum and 
naturalization policies (See Table 1.).  
 
Within the admissions field, the existing indices provide some innovative ideas on how to 
measure immigration policies. However, they are limited to particular areas of immigration 
admission such as those covering asylum policy (Hatton 2004; Thielemann 2004; Ortega and 
Peri 2009), labour migration (Cerna 2008; Lowell 2005) or the rights of migrant workers and 
their families (Ruhs 2011; EIU 2008; MIPEX 2011), The indices do not capture a 
comprehensive array of areas of immigration admission, and they typically include a limited 
number of indicators. 
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In the naturalization literature where many indicators have been built over the last decade, 
researchers apply very different conceptualizations (Bauböck and Helbling 2011). Some lead 
to indicators that focus on specific aspects of naturalization policies (Howard 2009). Others 
also include one or several aspects of integration policies (Huddleston and Niessen 2011; 
Koopmans et al. 2005; 2012 and Waldrauch and Hofinger 1997). This poses some content 
validity problems as the domain of the concept is not completely clear, nor it is apparent that 
a particular measure fully represents the domain (Blalock 1982).  
 
Most databases aim to capture the relative openness or restrictiveness of government policy 
when it comes to the admission of foreigners, and the rights granted to new immigrants once 
they are within the territory of a host state. Yet, there is disagreement over what this openness 
or restrictiveness constitutes. This disagreement is manifest in the coding choices made by a 
small proliferation of comparative immigration and integration policy datasets. Waldrauch 
and Hofinger (1997) cover eight Western European countries for the year 1995. In a first 
project Koopmans et al. (2005) presented data for five Western European countries and three 
time periods (1980, 1990, 2002). More recently, this dataset has been expanded to ten 
Western European countries and a fourth time period (2008) (Koopmans et al. 2012). The 
“Migration Integration Policy Index” (MIPEX) (Huddleston and Niessen 2011) includes all 
member states of the European Union plus Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland 
and the USA for the year 2010. The project started with the EU-15 in 2004 and expanded to 
the EU-25, Canada, Norway and Switzerland in 2007. Howard’s (2009) “Citizenship Policy 
Indicator” (CPI) covers the EU-15 for two periods in time (1980 and 2008). Janoski (2010) 
introduced two new output and outcome indices for 18 OECD countries and for the period 
1970 to 2005. Most recently, Koning (2011) presented his index that measures naturalization 
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policies in 26 Eastern and Western European countries as well as Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the USA, and the European Union (EU) as a separate policy jurisdiction. 
"
Measurement Validity"
Inter-temporality creates particular validity challenges, as it requires the researcher to develop 
measures that are both meaningful conceptually and valid through time. This goal is 
complicated by the nature of the changes that have occurred in immigration policy. For 
example, between 1980 and 2010 admissions policies in many countries became much more 
complex with a proliferation of selection criteria and categories. This creates the challenge of 
devising indicators that are parsimonious and not unduly complex in relation to earlier 
periods, but that also capture current-day migration regulation in all its sophistication.  
 
A good illustration of the issues around cross-sectional validity is provided by economists’ 
attempts to capture restrictiveness in immigration policies regarding workers’ mobility. 
Mayda (2010) and Ortega and Peri (2009) have developed restrictiveness indexes for 
economic migration in a set of OECD countries. Their inferred index of migration policy 
captures whether migration policy has become less or more restrictive as a result of policy 
reforms in the fields of family, economic and humanitarian migration. A major advantage of 
this approach is that it provides very useful information about the evolution of immigration 
policy through time within each destination country. For instance, Mayda (2010) covers 25 
years ranging from 1980 to 2005. Nevertheless, by capturing only the occurrence of policy 
reforms and not the actual statute, this approach does not allow for comparison of the content 
of policies across the destination countries. 
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Prominent indices also cover a limited number of countries. Timmer and Williamson (1998) 
developed an index, which measures the changes in the general restrictiveness of labour 
migration policy on a ten-point scale. However, this measure was only assessed on a 
relatively small number of aspects for the period between 1860 and 1930 and for six 
countries: the United States, Britain, Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Australia. Ruhs’ (2011) 
index is more elaborate and includes 35 indicators for 46 upper and middle-income countries. 
Yet, it remains restricted to one policy field and one year (2009). Building on Lowell’s 
(2005) work, Cerna’s (2008) study focuses on economic migration but covers only 20 high-
income countries and an index with six items. While Lowell studied 12 countries for the year 
2004, Cerna’s data covers the year 2007. 
"
To date, temporal and cross-sectional validity issues have scarcely been addressed in 
migration policy indicators, as existing indices are limited in their coverage of countries and 
time frames. Analysis is often restricted to recent years.  For example, MIPEX covers the 
years 2004, 2007 and 2010 (MIPEX 2011), while Howard examines 2008 and “the 1980s” 
(Howard 2009).iii Martin Ruhs’ study of openness, skills and rights considers the human 
rights of migrant workers and accompanying family members in 46 high and middle-income 
countries, for early 2008 and 2009 (Ruhs 2011, 6). An exception is Timmer and Williamson’s 
(1996) work, which measures the changes in the general restrictiveness of labour migration 
policy on a ten-point scale and covers the years 1860 through to 1930. Yet, historical 
coverage across time often comes at the cost of country coverage. Timmer and Williamson’s 
index of change in restrictiveness of immigration policy was only assessed on a relatively 
small number of aspects and only covered six countries.  
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Outputs vs. Outcomes 
Closely related to the question of the conceptual, spatial and temporal ambit of the issue 
under investigation, is the analyst’s decision about which aspects of policy products and 
processes to capture. The distinction between outcomes and outputs is well-rehearsed in 
policy studies. In the field of immigration policy, Hollifield, drawing on Easton (1965), 
characterized outputs as “the level of policy formulation”, while outcomes are “a least in part 
the result of policy implementation” (Hollifield 1986, 114-5). As such, we conceive policy 
outputs as the laws and policies surrounding the regulation of immigration and naturalization 
legislated or ordered by government entities. In contrast, policy outcomes like immigration 
stock or flows—although potentially partially resultant from these outputs—are affected to 
some extent by legislation.  They may also be caused by immigration push factors, and 
importantly in the migration field, by individual human agency. 
 
There are obvious advantages to considering outcomes as well as outputs. As Money (1999: 
22) notes, gauging only formal regulations (outputs) “leaves out important aspects such as the 
control, interpretation and implementation of laws as well as the consequences of formal 
regulations.” Some indices have focused on outcomes and used immigration flows as a proxy 
for immigration policy outputs. For instance, Boucher and Gest (2014) employ a panel of 
demographic measures to typologize and explain the direction of immigration regimes across 
50 countries. Money (1999) measured immigration policy as annual per capita immigrant 
inflows, examining twelve immigrant-receiving countries from 1962 to 1989. Kogan (2007) 
constructed a measure of the “relative selectivity” of immigration policy for 15 European 
Union countries between 1992 and 2000 by comparing the proportion of immigrants with 
tertiary education and against the tertiary educated native born. Neumayer (2004) uses 
asylum recognition rates as a proxy for asylum policies.  
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The drawback of using migration outcomes is at least twofold. First, while migration 
outcomes depend on policies, the reverse is also true. For instance, a country with a high rate 
of undocumented migration may have an elaborate set of restrictive policies attempting to 
prevent such migration. A policy index based on flows would spuriously classify the 
immigration policy as highly liberal. Second, migration outcomes are influenced by myriad 
factors, among which immigration policies constitute only one part. Indexes of stringency 
might therefore ascribe to immigration policies the compound effect of other determinants of 
migration.  Doing so may thereby ignore the “liberal paradox” used to explain the sometimes 
conflicting imperatives in the policy domain.  (Joppke 1998; Guiraudon and Joppke 2001). 
 
Conversely, focusing on policy outputs (rather than outcomes) can also be problematic, 
especially where adherence to de jure laws is supplanted by de facto realities on the ground 
(Money 1999:  22).  Existing databases have grappled with this important question and some 
have tried to address this issue by combining outputs and outcomes (i.e. Koopmans et al. 
2005, 38; Howard 2009, 24; MIPEX 2011; Thielemann 2003). Howard (2009) and 
Koopmans et al (2005) both use naturalization rates as part of their output indicators. Yet, by 
including naturalization rates, both studies simultaneously are highlighting but also blurring 
the crucial distinction between policy outputs and outcomes (Janoski 2010: 36). As a result it 
becomes unclear what exactly these studies are measuring. This raises concerns in turn about 
the aggregation of indicators. In fact, comparing outputs and outcomes arguably presents the 
best solution to this vexed issue.  
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Reliability and Transparency"
A further criticism of existing immigration policy indices is that many are insensitive to 
important gradations within policies. In their discussions of democracy indices, Elkins (2000) 
and Coppedge and Gerring (2011: 249) argue that, unlike simple indicators, continuous 
indicators are more precise as they are more sensitive to gradations (see also Bader 2007: 
876). Elkins (2000) shows that graded measures have superior validity and reliability. Some 
studies in the immigration field use a single variable to represent immigration policies.  For 
example, Neumayer (2004) uses determination rates as a proxy for the relative openness or 
restrictiveness of asylum policy. While such an approach is understandable in the absence of 
comparative data on the substance of asylum policies, it is nonetheless vulnerable given the 
highly politicized way in which recognition statistics are employed by governments. 
Thielemann (2004; 2006) uses a small number of indicators, which provides more nuanced 
measures. However, he still employs regenerated indices with only limited variance. Lowell 
(2005: 7) develops seven major indicators, ranked on a four-point scale, to assess skilled 
immigration policies.  
 
Naturalization indicators have been built in very different ways and include different amounts 
of data, directed at different conceptual issues. Howard’s Citizenship Policy Indicator (CPI) 
is the most parsimonious, as it is based on only three aspects of legal regulations and six 
variables. Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997) include almost 80 items in their index. Koopmans 
et al.’s (2005; 2012) study of settlement policy contains 40 sub-indicators that involve both 
legal and cultural aspects and codes jurisprudence, administrative decrees and local 
implementation practices. The MIPEX-indicator is based on a large range of over 140 sub-
indicators that have been collected by means of expert surveys (Huddelston and Niessen 
2011). This is also true of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global Migration Barometer that 
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covers naturalization issues in addition to some areas of immigration selection such as family 
reunification policy (EIU 2008). Ultimately, disagreement remains over which are the best 
indicators of naturalization policies. 
 
Aggregation"
Any study that seeks to make cross-national comparisons in public policy will invariably seek 
to combine indicators into a single index or summary score. Aggregation of this kind is often 
a valuable product of the analysis of large-scale datasets. However, the selection of indicators 
frequently involves trade-offs with overall summary measures coming at the expense of over-
simplification or loss of complexity. Unfortunately, there are too few cross national studies of 
immigration policy - broadly defined – for a substantial discussion of aggregation practices.   
 
The MIPEX (2011) study, which examines integration policies across a large number of 
countries, is one of the few that attempts such aggregation within the field of immigration. 
However useful, this database illustrates the extent to which aggregation can lead to the loss 
of data. Here, indicators are scored using a ranking procedure, but the scoring options are 
imprecise. For example, an indicator for the policy strand of labour market access within the 
policy dimension of labour market integration is defined as: “State facilitation of recognition 
of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU.” The definition of this indicator includes 
a list of sub-policies in a country year that include matters such as the existence of state 
agencies and information centres for the recognition of skills and qualifications; and 
information on profession-based language courses and on procedures for assessment of skills 
and qualifications. A coder must score this indicator on a 1-to-3 scale according to which 
combinations of the listed components are contained in national policy. Although the coder 
must determine whether the sub-policies identified are present in the national policy prior to  
12#
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Table 1: Existing immigration admission, naturalization and integration policy indices (framework based on Boucher and Gest 2014) 
 
Date Author Title of study  Countries considered Aspects of Immigration Policy considered Method and variables 
2006 Migration Policy 
Group 
Migration Integration 
Policy Index 
All EU states plus 
Switzerland, Norway, Canada 
and the United States 
Focuses in integration policy indicators 
including labour market mobility, family 
reunion, education, political participation, 
long-term residence, access to nationality 
and anti-discrimination laws. 
 
Expert survey coding that separates 
integration from immigration 
policy and uses unclear 
aggregation methods. 
2006 Rainer Bauböck, 
Eva Ersboll, 
Kees 
Groenendijk, 
and Harold 
Waldrauch 
 
Acquisition and Loss of 
Nationality. Policies and 
Trends in 15 European 
states 
15 European states Documents the diversity of legal regulations 
and policies concerning the acquisition and 
loss of nationality in the fifteen old Member 
States of the EU. Inquires whether any 
trends towards greater similarity are 
emerging from international and European 
law or from parallel domestic developments 
in the Member States. 
Expert survey coding basic legal 
techniques, procedural 
characteristics and material 
conditions 
(residence requirements, integrity 
clauses, conditions of integration, 
reasons for loss of 
nationality, etc.) as well as major 
changes to procedural details and 
conditions since 1985 (without 
data on administrative practice). 
 
2007 Costica 
Dumbravă 
Citizenship regulations 
in Eastern Europe 
16 Eastern European states. Applies Howard’s 2006 (2009) model for 
cross-national analysis of citizenship policy 
on Eastern European states to reveal its 
limitations outside the original 15 
(predominantly Western European) cases.  
Original policy analysis and coding 
of limited but clear indicators. 
2008 Francesco 
Ortega and 
Giovanni Peri 
Migration reforms index 14 OECD states Loosening and tightening of reforms of 
non-asylum and of asylum laws, based on 
legal indicators in FRDB 2012 and Mayda 
and Patel 2004 reform list. 
Original policy analysis and coding 
of bundled legal indicators. 
 
2009 Marc Howard The Acquisition of 
Nationality in EU 
Member States: Rules 
Practices and 
Quantitative 
Developments 
15 EU states Measures of jus soli, immigrant residency 
requirements, and dual citizenship 
allowances. 
Original policy analysis and coding 
of limited but clear indicators 
extrapolated to characterize 
citizenship regimes. 
Text
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Date Author Title of study  Countries considered Aspects of Immigration Policy considered Method and variables 
2010 Sarah Wallace 
Goodman 
Civic Integration Index 15 EU states Naturalization requirements of country 
knowledge, language acquisition, and value 
agreement. 
Original policy analysis and coding 
of limited but clear indicators. 
 
2010 Tomas Janoski The Ironies of 
Citizenship 
18 OECD states Naturalization rates Standardized calculation and 
comparison of citizenship policy 
outcomes. 
 
2011 Keith Banting 
and Will 
Kymlicka 
 
Multiculturalism Policy 
Index 
21 OECD states Measures the character and strength of 
multiculturalism policies and across three 
time intervals (1980, 2000, 2010) 
 
Original policy analysis and coding 
of limited but clear indicators. 
2011 Fondazione 
Rodolfo 
Debenedetti 
(fRDB) 
Index of Strictness of 
Migration Policies 
12 OECD states No. certificates and procedures to enter and 
to reside; No. years for permanent 
residency; No. administrations involved; 
No. of years of stay required for first 
residence permit; existence of quota system 
Expert coding based on policy 
documents, websites and 
secondary literature. 
2012 Ruud 
Koopmans, Ines 
Michalowski, 
and Stine 
Waibel 
Citizenship Rights for 
Immigrants 
Northern and Western Europe 
(soon non-European settler 
states) 
Nationality acquisition, family 
reunification, expulsion, anti-
discrimination, public-sector employment 
for non-nationals, political rights for non-
nationals, cultural rights in education, 
cultural and religious rights. 
Analysis of policy documents, 
legal texts, secondary literature, 
internet websites, and expert 
information 
 
 
 
 
This table is based on, and derives some content from, a similar table in A. Boucher and J. Gest (2014) ‘Migration Studies at a Crossroads: A Constructive Critique of 
Immigration Regime Classifications’ forthcoming in Migration Studies.
14"
"
determining the score, this information is not retained. Instead, the end user of MIPEX can 
determine only whether a country had either some or none of these policies. A researcher 
who would prefer to know whether each country provides information on language courses, 
for example, would be unable to obtain this information, as it is aggregated with other 
information. 
 
3 Methodological innovations: The IMPALA Database 
How, then, are we to make progress in the conceptualization and measurement of 
immigration policy? In arguing for a new approach, the IMPALA Database employs 
indicators structured around five major areas of admission: economic; family; humanitarian, 
student; irregular along with indicators for the acquisition and loss of naturalization; bi-lateral 
arrangements allowing migration between countries; and the legal frameworks for 
immigration control. As we explain below, a major innovation of the IMPALA Database 
project is the use of “entry tracks” as the primary focus of the data collection process. This 
allows us to concentrate on policy outputs, which has several advantages in terms of validity.  
It also allows for a multi-dimensional, disaggregated and transparent approach to data 
analysis. We close this section by describing the coding method and sample of countries and 
regulations on which our pilot study focuses.  
 
Conceptual Scope"
The aim of the IMPALA Project is to compile comparable data on immigration law and 
policy across six major areas of migration policy: economic migration, family reunification, 
humanitarian migration, irregular migration, student migration and the acquisition and loss of 
citizenship for migrants resident in the selecting state (see Table 2). These are the major 
categories of entry identified in OECD flow data reports (OECD 2010). Citizenship rules 
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cover the policies that control immigrants’ access to full membership of the new host society.  
In parallel to coding immigration laws and regulations around these areas, we identify the 
major bilateral agreements in the area of cross-border mobility of people and similarities and 
differences in the countries’ basic legal structures. A bilateral agreement is defined as an 
agreement that confers preferential treatment by the destination country to potential migrants 
coming from a particular origin country. Analysis of these agreements is important to capture 
relatively open movement between countries – for example between New Zealand and 
Australia.  It also captures historical forms of race- and ethnicity-based selection in former 
colonial empires such as France and the United Kingdom. Bilateral agreements not only 
cover aspects of immigration laws and policy that are specific to a pair of countries but also 
often introduce exceptions or derogations to existing laws and policy on a bilateral (or 
multilateral) basis. It is therefore crucial to account for such agreements if one wants to 
produce meaningful indices of the various dimensions of immigration policy. 
"
 
Table 2: IMPALA Coding Categories 
 
 
Economic migration 
 
 
Regulations for workers, investors, entrepreneurs 
 
Family reunification 
 
 
Regulations for partners, children, parents and extended family members  
 
Student migration 
 
 
Regulations for university, school, vocational and language students  
 
Humanitarian migration 
Regulations for asylum seekers, refugees, subsidiary protection, temporary 
protection, residence permits for personal reasons (such as domestic violence), 
medical reasons and for victims of human trafficking.  
 
Naturalization 
 
 
Modes of acquisition and loss of citizenship 
 
Irregular migration 
 
 
Regulations for immigrants entering a country without authorization and those 
who qualify for removability or exclusion. 
 
Bilateral agreements 
 
 
Preferential treatment for a particular origin country, compared to the general 
policy 
16"
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Table 2 lists different sub-groups that fall within the respective categories. In some cases, 
defining these sub-groups was relatively straightforward. For example, in relation to family 
migration, a biological distinction can be made between partners, children, parents and 
extended family. In other cases, however, the distinctions are less clear. For example, the 
IMPALA Consortium originally included as sub-categories within the economic sub-
category, the descriptors “highly skilled” and “labour migration.”  In attempting to fit the 
laws and policies of the target countries into these groupings, however, we encountered 
difficulties in finding common understandings of what constitutes “skilled” and “labour” 
migration at different times and in different contexts (see also McGovern 2012). Instead, we 
opted for a term of higher level abstraction, namely economic migration. 
 
In addition to the different immigration entry paths, the IMPALA Database covers 
naturalization eligibility granted after admission by a host society. As noted earlier, 
immigration and naturalization address different phenomena. Naturalization policies 
determine the acquisition of citizenship (and in some cases its loss) once immigrants have 
settled and met certain conditions. The EUDO Database provides the most expansive and 
detailed source of naturalization policy since 1985. Accordingly, we chose to build on 
EUDO’s categorization of citizenship acquisition and loss into separate “modes” (EUDO, 
2009a). As immigration and naturalization are conceptually distinct, we examine them as 
separate categories. Nonetheless, we believe that they are sufficiently interconnected to 
warrant consideration. Citizenship represents the final step of admission into the state—the 
legal hurdle that separates immigrants from official membership. Naturalization policies, 
especially those featuring citizenship tests or lengthy waiting periods, may act as deterrents 
against certain types of migratory flows (Goodman 2011). Policies can also act as attractions 
in the context of frequent amnesty decisions or liberal integration procedures. The track of 
17"
"
entry through which an immigrant enters a receiving country affects the conditions of her or 
his eligibility to naturalize. Consequently, an analysis of migration policy should also 
consider naturalization rules. 
 
Measurement Validity 
One of the principal innovations of the IMPALA Database project, and the principal source 
of cross-sectional and temporal validity, is the coding of ‘tracks of entry’. Originally 
introduced in Challen’s study of U.S. immigration policy (Challen 2013), tracks of entry are 
established in national law, and are normally defined as a particular mode of entry for a 
prospective migrant given her or his characteristics and purpose (e.g. family reunification, 
occupation, type and length of requested residence permit).iv.A specific example of a track of 
entry is the H-1B Visa offered in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1965. This allows employers to temporarily sponsor and employ foreign workers in 
speciality occupations. In order to take up the visa, the potential entrant must demonstrate 
that they hold a bachelor’s degree or equivalent qualifications allowing them to work in the 
nominated occupation. At the same time, the employer must demonstrate that a worker 
cannot be found locally for the position in question. The potential entrant is strictly limited to 
employment by the sponsoring employer.  Visas allowing entry on remarkably similar terms 
are used in other countries, allowing this specific example to be generalised into an entry 
track for the purposes of the database.  v  
 
For each category, such as economic, family, or humanitarian migration, two sets of 
questions have been developed as indicators for the overarching concept of 
restrictiveness/openess.vi The first set are asked once only at country level and relate to 
general issues of policy (e.g. the use of quotas) and the relevant international instruments to 
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which a country is party. The second are the track level questions that are applied to each visa 
or group of related visas within the relevant category. For instance, they include items on the 
actual application process, such as whether the applicant can apply independently or requires 
sponsorship, whether the entry track requires a points or labour shortage test; whether the 
track allows for permanent or temporary entry etc. Entry-level questions also capture 
personal characteristics such as age, marital status, education, language proficiency, and work 
experience, as well as requirements relating to health, character and legal status.vii  
 
By way of example, when it comes to comparing economic migration across countries, we 
can list the relevant tracks for each country and then examine how they compare in terms of 
restrictiveness. The listing or non-listing of the tracks will tell us if a country has a specific 
policy for admitting highly skilled, semi-skilled labour migrants, or seasonal workers. So, we 
have been able to learn that the United Kingdom does admit low-skilled labour migrants 
despite having a supposedly ‘zero immigration’ policy since the 1970s. Like Australia, 
Germany and the US, it also has specific tracks to attract graduate and professional migrants.  
 
In addition, by using the responses to the pre-designed questions for each track we can 
compare the relative stringency of the policies.  Within economic migration, for example, we 
ask if the applicant must be sponsored by an employer; if the employer can only sponsor after 
searching local labour markets, or if the migrant must leave the country on losing their job, 
and so on. Further, the focus on tracks means that we can search for likely variations within 
more general categories, such as the possibility that children may enjoy a relative lack of 
restrictiveness within family reunification policies.  
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Outputs vs. Outcomes 
The coding of entry tracks and their requirements inevitably means that our research focuses 
on immigration policy outputs rather than policy outcomes. As discussed earlier, conflating 
outcomes and outputs would undermine the content validity of the measures we seek to 
ascertain, and would hinder the interpretation of findings.  Outputs are themselves defined 
broadly in the IMPALA Project to include immigration acts, associated regulations, policy 
manuals and directives. As much as possible, we have sought to minimize reliance on case 
law that interprets these legislative instruments, on the grounds that such interpretation may 
create ambiguities for coders. Exceptionally, the orientation of humanitarian-immigration 
regulations is powerfully shaped by this type of law so coders working in this area must also 
consult case law from apex courts.viii In the other categories, case law is consulted only if 
primary and secondary legislation, policy manuals and executive decrees, do not clearly 
indicate the law. 
 
Having said this, the IMPALA policy outputs may be analysed in conjunction with existing 
datasets on migration flows and stock.   For instance, we think it would be very useful to 
analyse the IMPALA data in conjunction with the kind of outcome-oriented variables that are 
being developed by other researchers.ix 
 
Case selection 
The entry track approach is being developed and refined through pilot test studies of six 
diverse countries. This sample included a mixture of “settler societies”, such as Australia and 
the United States, “post-colonial societies” such as the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. We also include one small European country, Luxembourg, which has had quite 
limited immigration legislation until recently, despite hosting a relatively large foreign labour 
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force for decades. The advantage of selecting cases according to the principle of maximum 
variation (Patton 2002, 234-5) is that the heterogeneity can be used to identify indicators that  
work across a wide range of immigration regimes. In other words, if it is possible to identify 
(immigration) category questions that work for these very different cases, then there is a real 
prospect that the questions will also work for countries that fall within this range of 
experience. Nonetheless, this diversity has also revealed that that some of the policy 
innovations developed by the “settler” are sui generis and cannot therefore be compared with 
equivalent policies among other countries, simply because they do not exist.  
 
Subject to financial support and the availability of the legal sources, the ultimate aim of the 
IMPALA Project is to code all developed (OECD) economies that have experienced net 
immigration over the fifty years between 1960 and 2010. The European Union is coded as a 
separate case.x  
 
The planned national coverage of the IMPALA database encompasses most economies in the 
OECD, except those with negative net immigration (i.e. net emigration) over the past two 
decades. This leaves 26 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries receive the most 
international migrants and include the five receiving the most immigrants over the past 50 
years: the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. 
Furthermore, given the emphasis of the project on the way countries select migrants, the 
countries are also chosen on the basis of the importance of skilled immigration.  
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To illustrate the importance of our countries selection, Figures One and Two provide the 
proportion of total and skilled immigration for each country considered in the IMPALA 
project. The data refers to the last version of the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) database 
providing bilateral migration stocks by education level.xi Figure One gives the proportion of 
immigrants in total world immigration in each destination country.  Figure Two provides the 
same information, focusing on skilled immigration only. Skilled immigrants refer here to 
migrants with tertiary education. 
 
These countries receive a significant proportion of international migrants: of the estimated 
191 million international migrants in 2005, for instance, over 60 percent resided in these 
countries (according to estimates provided by the United Nations Population Division in 
2007). In the Docquier-Marfouk (2006) dataset, the IMPALA case countries represent about 
half of the total immigration in 2000. More importantly, our selection of countries captures 
about 70% of the global immigration of skilled workers. This is important since the project 
aims to capture not only restrictive policies in terms of global immigration, but also policies 
targeting certain categories of immigrants. Figure Two illustrates the important role played 
by the traditional English speaking countries (US, UK, Australia and Canada) in attracting 
educated workers. The data also illustrated that continental European countries such as 
Germany and France tend to attract a higher proportion of unskilled workers compared to 
English-speaking countries. The project aims at shedding some light on the role played by 
immigration policies in that global process. 
 
Aside from the importance of the selected countries in terms net immigration, the group also 
includes cases that can be subsumed under well-known typologies of immigration regimes. 
These include the distinctions between Western democracies, English speaking settler 
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societies founded by European emigrants, and European countries that experienced mass 
migration after World War Two (Freeman 1997); settler, guestworker and postcolonial 
regimes (Joppke 1999) and, finally, “countries of immigration,” “reluctant countries of 
immigration” and “recent countries of immigration” (Cornelius et al. 2004). While there is a 
clear liberal democratic and Western focus in this case selection, it is in the belief that these 
countries at present provide the most readily available data on immigration policy outputs. 
 
 
 
Figure One: Proportion of immigration in each IMPALA country, stocks, year 2000.  
 
Source Docquier-Marfouk (2006) and own calculations. 
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Figure Two: Proportion of skilled immigration in each IMPALA country, stocks, 2000.  
 
Source Docquier-Marfouk (2006) and own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
With regard to federal systems of government, IMPALA focuses on coding national level 
policy outputs, while noting sub-national issues in the codebook associated with relevant 
countries. Codebooks will be made available to future researchers to identify the need for 
further exploration of sub-national variation. For the time being, they also reduce the 
complexity of the final database construction. This approach has been adopted in other public 
policy fields (i.e. Keck et al 2009, 17).  
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Reliability and Transparency 
To maximize reliability and transparency across the cases, the IMPALA coding process 
adopts four key strategies.  First, it codes documents according to a standardized procedure, 
with citation at every level, using coders skilled in law, policy and archival research. The 
coding is based on referenced and cited acts of parliament and other legal documents, rather 
than on experts’ memories or opinions. This increases the reliability (as well as validity) of 
the coding. Second, these documents are coded following standardized questions that vary by 
category but that apply to all countries, tracks and and years within a category.  Among other 
things, the questions capture rules establishing the numbers and types of immigrants that can 
enter a country, the conditions under which immigrants can enter, live and work, and their 
legal rights. Third, the questions are worded and designed to be answered easily in terms of 
the legal text. Most questions (and associated codes) are binary, providing “yes/no” responses 
that simply indicate the presence or absence of specific measures (e.g. whether asylum 
seekers are detained while applications are pending). In other cases, the coding gathers 
quantitative data on variables such as number of admissions allowed each year for specific 
applicants, the duration of stay allowed, waiting periods, and the like. All such questions can 
be answered from reading the legal documents. Fourth, all such coding is explicitly 
referenced at level of each question, providing transparency and reliability checks at the 
finest level of detail with respect to immigration policy and law. 
 
Aggregation"
The fact that immigration control is a multi-faceted concept means that any attempt to 
summarize the data in composite indices must address problems of aggregation. More 
specifically, we have to consider which indicators should be combined into a single index; 
whether they should be added or multiplied; and the amount by which they should be 
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weighted. The IMPALA Project adheres to a methodological principle of “post-coding 
aggregation.”  Aside from focusing on entry tracks and devising a lengthy series of questions 
that are derived from the idea of openness/restrictivness we have not devised a series of 
concepts and indicators to organize and capture data. This means that the decision over how 
these tracks will be aggregated to construct composite measures is decided at a later stage, 
once the “universe” of visa tracks and categories becomes known through the initial coding 
process.   
 
This stage will involve a range of transparently derived algorithms for combining the raw 
coded information into track-specific and multi-track measures of stringency and of bias. The 
method is facilitated by scaling answers to questions relevant to restrictiveness as taking-on 
higher values for higher stringency.  For instance, the binary “yes-no” questions are scaled as 
1 for higher stringency and 0 for less. The simplest measure of restrictiveness could be to 
sum the values in a given track-country-year – ignoring quantitative or qualitative 
information whose implications for stringency are less obvious, and without weighting of 
aspects of law more or less relevant to such stringency.  
 
This would provide an indicator of stringency for a very particular type of migrant. A similar 
approach could also apply to a broad category of migrants (for example, economic or 
humanitarian). The proportion of entry tracks within a category that is subject to a specific 
restriction (e.g. request of visa fee) would shed light on the extent to which a destination 
country imposes this specific restriction and how it compares with other countries. The 
combination of both approaches (aggregation across questions and aggregation across tracks) 
could lead to more global indicators of stringency in admissions policy. Of course, any 
natural complications that arise will be discussed and addressed. One such complication is 
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how to implement an appropriate weighting scheme. Once again, this applies to aggregation 
across questions (some restrictions might be more important than others) and aggregation 
across tracks (some tracks obviously involve more applicants than others). For the latter 
approach, some weighting scheme based on migration flows appears as a possible and 
intuitive solution. Nevertheless, this tends to omit the magnitude of migration flows for a 
given track or category is highly endogenous. For example, the size of a specific flow 
depends in turn on the degree of specific restrictions applied to a given category. Another 
tricky issue is the treatment of missing data. If there is uncertainty in the law about a 
particular restriction, one could assume that the restriction is absent and one could treat 
missing information as a zero in the aggregation process. On the other hand, uncertainty 
implies that missing information and zero coding are not completely equivalent. One needs to 
think in deep details how to deal with that before setting any aggregation algorithm. 
 
More complicated methodologies will consider also the bilateral dimension of our database, 
accounting for instances where immigration laws and policies are quite often discriminatory 
across origin countries, particularly as we go back in time. For example, a particular 
restriction might apply to all countries except for particular partner countries. Accounting for 
this bilateral treatment is essential if restriction indicators need to be included in dyadic 
models of migration (see for instance Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2011). The second stage 
aggregation will involve a range of more complicated methods that will be transparent and 
open to scrutiny and debate, and that can be used or ignored as data users see fit. We intend 
to provide future users with guidelines on how to aggregate the data and to build indicators of 
entry restriction for each field of migration.  
The result is a comprehensive coding of national immigration policy regimes at a 
considerable level of detail. Despite some cost to parsimony, we believe that this approach 
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makes considerable gains.  It is a method that minimizes data loss.  It comprehensively 
captures the variation in complexity of different immigration policy systems, which is itself 
of important theoretical and conceptual relevance. It increases transparency, as any composite 
measure can be easily deconstructed to observe precisely which policies for which visa 
categories determine the score for each country and year.  Finally, this approach grants future 
data analysts the ability to decide how best to aggregate information to produce measures 
specific for their projects. Some users will look for detailed legal wording related to a 
particular kind of immigrant in a particular country in a particular year. Others will look to 
build one or another measure of general policy stringency. Still others will look to identify 
the degree of bias in rules with respect to the favoring or targeting of particular kinds of 
immigrants and immigrant characteristics. The IMPALA database and its form of 
dissemination can serve all such approaches. 
 
4 Discussion 
In this article, we have explored the primary methodological challenges in the comparative 
measurement of migration policies. These include identifying the conceptual scope and 
validity of regulations across many categories of law, policy and regulation in different 
national and temporal settings; developing systematic, reliable and valid measures of the 
content of such complex and diverse regulations, laws and policies; and aggregating this 
information to measure general policy stringency and bias without losing sight of the nuance 
of legal content specific to time and place.  We have outlined new ways to address these 
challenges, as devised by the IMPALA consortium in its data collection exercise. 
Consequently, for the first time, we will be able to identify clusters of immigration policy 
output regimes, assess variation in national policies, and trace processes of 
convergence/divergence in migration regimes across countries and across time.  
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The following are three examples of the kind of research questions that can be addressed with 
these data. The first relates to one of our key concepts, namely that of restrictiveness. In an 
early overview of the growing literature on immigration policy Massey noted an emerging 
paradox of globalization:  
 
While the global economy unleashes powerful forces that produce larger and more 
diverse flows of migrants from developing to developed countries, it simultaneously 
creates conditions within developed countries that promote the implementation of 
restrictive immigration policies. (Massey 1999, 312).  
 
The IMPALA project is ideally placed to test this claim as it makes it possible to investigate 
variations in immigration policy across countries, through time, and between and within 
categories of immigration law. Has there been a significant increase in the restrictiveness of 
immigration laws across the sample countries?  Have some areas of immigration become 
more restrictive than others? Can patterns of openness and restrictiveness be detected across 
groups of countries? Answering the latter question may, for instance, shed new light on 
existing typologies of immigrant receiving nations. One such schema contrasts the relatively 
liberal “settler societies” (Australia, Canada, United States) and the Nordic countries with the 
more restrictive “colonizers” (France, Netherlands, United Kingdom) and Japan, Germany, 
Switzerland, the highly restrictionist “non-colonizing” countries (Janoski 2010). Regardless 
of whether there is a gap between the intentions and outcomes in immigration policy 
(Cornelius et al, 2004) theories of immigration policy can only be improved by having a more 
accurate map of the terrain that they are trying to explain.   
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A second example comes from the literature on the economics of migration where the 
determinants of international migration are of particular interest. Here one strand of the 
literature claims that the size and skill composition of international migration flows reflect 
wage, occupation and skill characteristics in the sending and host countries while another 
strand emphasizes the influence of existing networks and diasporas (Grogger and Hanson, 
2011; Beine et.al., 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011 ). So far, the impact of immigration 
policies has not been considered because of poor or non-existent measures. IMPALA-derived 
evidence can advance the debate by examining the effects of immigration policy in its various 
dimensions (restrictiveness, selectivity, generosity of asylum and refugee policy, family 
reunion programmes, temporary versus permanent status) on the size and skill composition of 
immigration. This will considerably contribute to the existing literature on the determinants 
of immigration flows. At the same time, it will allow us to investigate which dimensions of 
immigration policies make a difference and for a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of 
immigration policies in their various dimensions across countries. 
 
The third example, which is primarily of interest to political scientists and international 
relations scholars, relates to one of the more striking developments of late 20th century inter-
state relations, namely the rise of supra-national forms of governance. Focusing on the 
European Union (EU), this research can investigate a fundamental issue related to the origins 
of national-level immigration laws: How do EU-level immigration laws and policy constrain 
and influence the development of member-state laws and practices?  For instance, scholars 
disagree on whether family reunification and national asylum laws in Europe are being 
ratcheted towards more or less harmonization, races to the bottom or top by the development 
of EU immigration laws (Geddes 2000; Luedtke 2009; Thielemann and El-Enany 2009; 
Pascouau and Labayle 2011).  The IMPALA dataset on asylum and family reunification 
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policies in Europe can be used to conduct the first systematic empirical test of these 
competing hypotheses.  By coding and comparing national and EU laws across countries and 
over time, the data collected will enable us not only to confirm or reject existing hypotheses.  
It will also allow the development of new hypotheses that will enable us to further specify the 
conditions under which one might expect regional cooperation to restrict or enhance the 
rights of refugees and accompanying family. 
 
Overall, we expect that the ability to make easy comparisons across different policy realms 
and countries will set new benchmarks. It will help in the identification of best practice and 
sub-optimal policy choices across a range of areas. An important objective of the IMPALA 
Project is to improve on how immigration policy is discussed across borders. It is our hope 
that the Database will work to eventually enhance the sophistication of policy discourse more 
generally in this most significant and politically charged area of public administration.xii 
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i While we recognize that the total global population has grown congruently such that migrants comprise the 
same share of the world’s population, the absolute increase in numbers and their concentration in certain 
destination states has challenged those governments’ regulation of immigration management. This has also 
altered many countries’ demographic profiles in significant ways (See Boucher and Gest 2014). 
ii Indices are understood as highly aggregated, composite measures of immigration policy, while indicators are 
understood as more specific, disaggregated elements that are individually coded. 
iii When in the 1980s is not clearly specified in Howard 2009. 
iv Tracks of entry should be distinguished from visa programmes such as the General Skilled Immigration 
programme in Australia which comprises a number of visas, with different rules associated with each and even 
conceptual differences within particular visas known as ‘sub-visas’. In this example, the sub-visas constitute 
distinct tracks of entry. 
v As the ultimate aim is to compare admissions regimes across countries, it is important to understand that 
countries represent the units of analysis in our research while an individual track is the unit of observation. 
vi Note that we  do not define different entry tracks when coding bilateral agreements. Each bilateral agreement 
is treated as one particular mode of entry. Here we simply capture whether the agreement gives preferential 
access with respect to the general policy. Similarly, acquisition and loss of citizenship are not coded as entry 
tracks but rather, rely upon a system developed by Waldrauch and Hofinger (1997) identifying 27 modes of 
acquisition of citizenship and 15 modes of loss. These ‘modes’ are different from the tracks identified in the 
other areas of our study in that they are not derived from national legislation. Rather, they are a conceptual 
typology that is constant across countries and countries are coded as either having or not having a particular 
mode.  
vii It is important to emphasize that while we have a set schedule of questions for the entry tracks identified in 
different countries the identification of those tracks is an inductive process. Aside from mostly diplomatic tracks 
we simply code whatever tracks are used. 
viii Apex courts are higher courts and tribunals of record, with a preference given to courts of final appeal, where 
relevant decisions are available. 
ix See for instance, the recent project to develop outcome indicators for immigration to Latin American states: 
Puentes, R. , A.  Canales, H.  Rodriguez, R.  Delgado-Wise, and S.  Castles. 2010.  
x With respect to the EU, we have decided to code national laws: i) mentioning explicit rules for EU nationals 
where appropriate as a separate track, and code those laws in terms of questions that include explicit reference to 
EU laws where appropriate; ii) code EU law as if it were a country, with respect to the same coding system, 
methodology (in terms of categories, subcategories, tracks, and questions per track); iii) include, if possible, 
treatment of bilateral agreements (certainly between national countries with such, including those addressing 
EU-specific rules. For European nations, we also distinguish between EU and Third Country National entry 
tracks in order to capture the different rules governing entry and naturalization for these two groups. EU 
countries with accession arrangements are not included in the country sample.  
xi See Docquier and Marfouk (2006), update of release 2.1. of April 2013. This dataset provides the bilateral 
stocks for three education levels for all countries of origin (203 countries) and most destinations (194 countries). 
The initial version included only 30 destinations. The data refers to stocks observed in 2000, the most recent 
year available in the dataset. 
xii  For a discussion of the claims made about the efficacy of policies in the area of asylum and border control in 
Australia see Crock and Ghezelbash 2011. 
